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the scope of its relationships with other companies. On the other hand, GSAs bring together partners from different national origins, with often sharp differences in the collaborating firms' culturaland political bases. As in the above illustration, there may also exist considerable diversity in firm-specificcharacteristicsthatmay be tied to each firm's nationalheritage.
Interfirm diversity can severely impede the ability of companies to work jointly and effectively [Adler and Graham 1989; Harrigan 1988; Perlmutter and Heenan 1986] , since many GSA partners-relative newcomers to voluntarycooperative relationshipswith foreign firms-have yet to acquire the necessary skills to cope with their differences. Not surprisingly, the rapid growth of GSAs is accompanied by high failure rates [Hergertand Morris 1988; Porter 1986 ].' Before probing the nexus between diversity and alliance performance,however, it is fruitful to begin with the recognition that (1) in GSAs, significant interfirm diversity is to be expected, and (2) this diversity can be analytically separatedinto two types. Type I includes the familiar interfirmdifferences (interdependencies) that GSAs are specifically created to exploit. These differences fonn the underlyingstrategicmotivations for entering into alliances; an inventory of such motivations is provided, for instance, by Contractorand Lorange [1988: 10] . Thus, Type I diversity deals with the reciprocal strengths and complementaryresources furnishedby the alliance partners, differences that actually facilitate the formulation, development, and collaborative effectiveness of GSAs.
Type II diversity, the major focus of this paper, refers to the differences in partnercharacteristicsthat often negatively affect the longevity and effective functioning of GSAs. Over the life of the partnership,the dynamics of Types I and II are very different, since the two types are differentially impacted by the processes of organizationallearning and adaptation.In the case of Type I, learning throughthe GSA may enable one partnerto acquire the skills and technologies it lacked at the time of alliance formation, and eventually rewrite the partnershipterms or even discard the other partner. Thus, the GSA becomes a race to learn, with the company that learns fastest dominating the relationship and becoming, through cooperation, a more formidable competitor. Conversely, organizational learning and adaptation can progressively mitigate the impact of Type II differences, thereby promoting longevity and effectiveness. To summarize, a minimum level of Type I differences are essential to the formation and maintenance (raison d'etre) of an alliance, and their erosion destabilizes the partnership.Type II differences, though inevitably present at the initiation of an alliance, may be overcome by iterative cycles of learning that strengthen the partnership.
A large number of previous studies have examined how Type II interfirm differences can play a major role in frustrating the joint efforts of GSA partners.For example, Adler and Graham [1989] found that cross-cultural negotiations are more difficult than intra-culturalnegotiations. Several other studieshave also establishedthatnegotiationsbetweenbusinesspeopleof differentculturesoften fail because of problemsrelatedto cross-cultural differences[Adler1986; Black 1987 Oliver [1990] . However, the conceptual domainof GSAsmustincludetheadditional propertiesof being international in scope, mixed-motive(competitive + cooperative)in nature, and of strategicsignificanceto each partner, i.e., tied to the firms' current andanticipated corebusinesses, markets, andtechnologies (commonly referred to as the corporatemission).Thus,GSAs arethe relativelyenduringinterfirm cooperativearrangements, involvingcross-border flows and linkages thatutilizeresourcesand/orgovernancestructures fromautonomous organizationsheadquartered in two or morecountries, forthejointaccomplishment of individualgoals linkedto the corporate missionof eachsponsoringfirm. This definitiondelineatesGSAs from single-transaction marketrelationships,as well as fromunrelated diversification moves,whileaccommodating the variety of strategic motives and organizational forms that accompany global partnerships.For example, GSAs can be used as transitional modes of organizational structure [Gomes-Casseres 1989] in response to current challenges as firms grope to find more permanent structures including, sometimes, whole ownership after the GSA has achieved its purpose. Often, however, longevity is an importantyardstick of performancemeasurement by each parent company [Harrigan1985; Lewis 1990 ].
It must be clearly noted that longevity is an imperfect proxy for "alliance success." Longevity can be associated, for instance, with the presence of high exit baffiers.And in some alliances, success can also be operationalized in terms of othermeasuressuch as profitability,marketshare,and synergistic contribution toward parent companies' competitiveness (cf. Venkatraman and Ramanujam[1986] ). Yet, achievement of these latter objectives can be thwarted by premature, unintended dissolution of the GSA. Furthermore, objective performance measures (e.g., GSA survival and duration)are significantly and positively correlated with parent firms' reported (that is, subjective) satisfaction with GSA performanceand with perceptions of the extent to which a GSA performedrelative to its initial objectives [Geringer and Hebert 1991] , so that for many research purposes the use of longevity as a surrogatefor a favorable GSA outcome is probably not too restrictive. With the above limitations acknowledged, we focus mainly on the subset of GSAs where longevity (not planned termination)is sought by each partner, but is threatenedby problems stemming from Type II interfirm diversity; however, inasmuch as planned termination represents an important potential alliance outcome involving the deliberate erosion of Type I diversity, it is treated as a special case of a more general diversity/longevity dynamic model later in the paper. 
DIMENSIONSOF INTERFIRMDIVERSITYIN GSAs
The major dimensions of Type II interfirm diversity in global strategic alliances are described below; Table 1 summarizes this discussion.2 In a departure from previous studies that have focused on limited aspects of interfirm diversity, Table 1 spans multiple, critical levels of analysis that are indispensable in providing a fuller understandingof the factors that may lead to friction and eventual collapse of the GSA. In addition, the following discussion also includes an analysis of how each diversity dimension can influence ongoing reciprocal learning within the partnership,an important consideration in the study of alliance longevity and effectiveness. Table 1 distinguishes between levels of conceptualization and levels of phenomena. Levels of phenomena refer to dimensions of interfirm diversity that can, with arguable intersubjectivity, be observed and measured. (Hofstede [1983] , for example, operationalized culture in four dimensions.) Conceptual levels deal with ideas and theories about phenomena. Thus, the social behavior of interfacing managers from each GSA partnerfirm is an output of the managers'respective societal (meta), national (macro), corporate-level (meso), and operating-level (micro) influences. While the actual behaviors can be observed, appreciatingthe often significant differences between them requiresan abstractionto the underlyingconceptuallevel of analysis. Finally, it is noted that the dimensions in the typology are often interrelated, and therefore-cannotbe treated as mutually exclusive. For example, strikingly different temporal orientations often exist in U.S. versus Japanesecorporations.The forner, pressed by investors and analysts, may tend to focus on quarterlyearnings reports, while the latter focus on establishing their brandnames and internationalmarketing channels, a sine qua non of higher order advantage leading to greater world market shares over a period of several years. Thus, Japanesepartnersmay give GSAs more time to take root, whereas their U.S. counterpartsmay be more impatient.
Societal
Significant differences may also exist on the issues of power and control. As Perlmutterand Heenan [1986] assert, Americans have historically harbored the belief thatpower, not parity,should govern collaborative ventures. In contrast, the Europeans and Japanese often consider partnersas equals, subscribe to management by consensus, and rely on lengthy discussion to secure stronger commitment to shared enterprises. 
StrategicDirections
As Harrigan[1985] observes, "asymmetries in the speed with which parent firms want to exploit an opportunity, the direction in which they want to move, or in otherstrategicmattersare destabilizingto GSAs" (p.14). Partner screening at the alliance planning stage tests for strategic compatibility by analyzing a potentialpartner'smotivationand ability to live up to its commitments, by assessing whether there may exist probable areas of conflict due to overlapping interests in present marketsor futuregeographic and product market expansion plans. Yet, a revised analysis may become necessary as the partners' evolving internal capabilities, strategic choices, and market developments pull them in separate directions, diminishing the strategic fit of a once-perfect match. Strategic divergence is particularlylikely in environments characterizedby high volatility, rapidadvances in technology, and a blurring and dissolution of traditionalboundaries between industries.7 One key to managing diverging partnerinterests may be to build flexibility into the partnershipstructure,which allows companies to adjust to changes in theirinternalandexternalenvironments.Flexible structuresmay be attained, for example, by initiating alliances on a small scale with specific, short-term agreements (such as cross-licensing or second sourcing), instead of huge deals that can pose "lock-in" problems with shifting strategic priorities. In a gradually developed relationship, areas of cooperation can be expanded to a broader base to the extent that continuing strategic fit exists. Alternatively, flexibility can be attained by entering into a general (or blanket) cooperative agreement which is activated on an as-needed basis. Proposition 4: Divergence in the parents' strategic directions will be negatively related to GSA longevity. The relationship between divergence and longevity will be moderatedby structuralflexibility that pernits adaptationto shifting environments.
Strategy can affect organizational learning, and through learning alliance longevity, in various ways. Since strategy determines the goals and objectives and the breadth of actions available to a firm, it influences learning by providing a boundaryto decisionmaking and a context for the perception and interpretationof the environment [Daft and Weick 1984] . In addition, as Miller and Friesen [1980] show, a firm's strategic direction creates a momentum for organizational learning, a momentum that is pervasive and highly resistant to small adjustments.
ManagementPracticesand Organization
The wide interfirm diversity in management styles, organizational structures, and other operational-level variables that exists across firms from different parts of the world can largely be traced to diversity along the first four dimensions discussed above. In turn, these differences, illustrated by the Daimler Benz versus Mitsubishi contrastat the outset of this paper, can heighten operatingdifficulties and triggerprematuredissolution of the GSA. An important issue in this regard is the problem of effectively combining the diverse systems of autonomous internationalfirms, each accustomed to operating in a certain manner.
Many researchersin intemnational cooperativestrategieshave tended, perhaps unwittingly, to focus solely on this final dimension of interfirm diversity (e.g., Dobkin [1988] ; Hall [1984] ; Pucik [1988] ). Among the major differences that have been noted are the style of management (participatoryor authoritarian),delegation of responsibility (high or low), decisionmaking (centralized or decentralized), and reliance on formal planning and control systems (high or low). To prevent problems of unclear lines of authority, poor communication, and slow decisionmaking, GSAs may need to set up unitary management processes and structures,where one decision point has the authorityand independence to commit both partners.Implementationof this recommendation is difficult in cases where both partners are evenly matched in terms of company size and resource contributions to the GSA (cf. Killing [1982] ).8 Yet, agreement on the streamlining of tough operational-level issues must be reachedprior to commencement of the GSA. Proposition5: Diversityin the sponsoringfirms'operatingcharacteristics will be negatively related to longevity of the GSA. This relationship will be moderated by the establishment of unitary management processes and structures. Though structureis often seen as an outcome of organizational learning, it plays a crucial role in determiningthe learningprocess itself [Fiol and Lyles 1985] . This observation can be important in the context of GSAs, where one firm's centralized, mechanistic structure that tends to reinforce past behaviors can collide with another firm's organic, decentralized structure that tends to allow shifts of beliefs and actions. More broadly, different management practices and organizational structures can enhance or retard learning, depending upon their degree of formalization, complexity, and diffusion of decision influence.
Theory and practice are linked in Table 2 , which illustrates how significant Type II differences between GSA partnerscan impact the entire spectrum of alliance activities. For the sake of brevity, Table 2 outlines only a select number of characteristicsthat are derived from the typological dimensions of Table 1 . Yet, a review of Table 2 clearly indicates that: (1) the extent of interfirm diversity in global strategic alliances may be high; and (2) as stressed earlier, the various dimensions of diversity are not distinct and unrelated, but rathershare a common core that touches GSAs.
Furthermore,Type I and Type II diversity can undergo distinctly different patterns over time, generating different alliance outcomes. The dynamic model of longevity presented in the next section suggests that a pivotal factor in the interfirm diversity/alliance outcome link is organizational learning and adaptationto diversity by the GSA partners.
LONGEVITYIN GSAs: A LEARNING-BASEDDYNAMIC MODEL
Organizational theorists [Lyles 1988; Fiol and Lyles 1985 ] define learning as "the development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions," and adaptation as "the ability to make incremental adjustments." Learning can be minor, moderate, or major. In stimulus-response terms, in minor learning, an organization's worldview (tied to its national and corporate identity) remains the same, and choice of responses occurs from the existing behavioral repertoire. In moderate learning, partial modification of the interpretative system and/or development of new responses is involved. And in major learning, substantial and irreversible restructuringof one or both of the stimulus and response systems takes place [Hedberg 1981 ]. This conceptualization parallels Argyris and Schon's [1978] single-loop (or lowlevel) learning that serves merely to adjust the parameters in a fixed structure to varying demands, versus double-loop (or high-level) learning that changes norms, values, and worldviews, and redefines the rules for lowlevel learning.
Using a contingency theoryperspective,we may expect the extent of learing (minor, moderate, or major) necessary for a given level of GSA longevity to be commensurate with the extent of interfirm diversity. Highly similar Thus, the relationship between diversity and longevity is dynamic, and is strongly influenced by the amount of learning and adaptation occurring between the GSA partners.The greater the amount of learning, the greater the negative impact of Type I diversity on longevity, but the smaller the negative impact of Type II diversity on longevity.
IMPLICATIONSAND CONCLUSIONS
The processmodel of longevity proposedin this paper,drawingupon learningbased management of differences in the properties of the partners, offers rich and exciting opportunitiesfor improved research and practice in GSAs. Only a few of these are touched upon below.
First, there is a need for inductive theory-building (following covariance structuremodeling and empirical research) on the relative importance, patterns of interconnectedness, and tension-inducing capacity of the typological dimensions of diversity in a variety of partneringsituations, especially in longitudinal studies focusing on the phases of alliance development. Such research will be timely and useful for developing ex post alliance performance generalizations as well as ex ante partnerselection criteria. Although preliminary work has been done in both of these areas, as noted above, the research has been fragmented and theory-building in GSAs has been slow, reflecting the lack of systematic conceptualization of a typology of interflrm diversity, much less a dynamic link between diversity and longevity. In conclusion, as global finns' technological,financial,andmarketingprowess increasingly becomes tied to the excellence of their external organizational relations, "GSA sophistication"-the ability to diagnose importantdifferences between partners and fashion a productive partnershipby devising novel solutions to accommodate the differences-is likely to become an imperative. GSAs represent a type of competitive weapon, in that they involve interorganizationalcooperation in the pursuit of global competitive advantage. Sharpeningthe edge of this competitive weapon may requirethe adoption of multifirm, multiculturalperspectives in joint decisionmaking, a process rendered difficult by the perceptual blinders imposed by culturebound and corporate-boundthinking (e.g., respectively, the "ugly foreigner" mentalityand the NIH, or not inventedhere,syndrome).9Thus, futureresearch on GSA longevity and performance must take into account the partners' cognition of, and adaptationto, the importantdimensions of diversity that is an integral, inescapable part of such alliances.
NOTES
1. Although other factors, such as hidden agendas and conceptually flawed logic of the GSA may also account for a portion of these failures, interfirm diversity remains a prime culprit. Moreover, as noted shortly, dissolution of a GSA does not necessarily constitute failure. When GSAs are used as "stepping stones," their termination may be viewed by the parents as a success, not a failure.
to market developments and management information systems that accurately reflect the magnitude and scope of the alliance.
9. This problem may be particularly severe for Japanese companies, whose overseas activities until recently strongly emphasized exports and direct investments in wholly owned subsidiaries. The historically closed nature of Japan's society and corporations makes integrating outsiders-even other Japanese-difficult.
